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Abstract
It is well documented that Americans’ trust in many major social institutions has declined for at least half a century.
Our objective in this paper is to do two things. First, we use General Social Survey (GSS) data collected between
1973 and 2021 to document this trend for 12 specific social institutions. Second, and more significantly, we focus
on changes in Americans’ trust in five social institutions: the military, education, medicine, science, and the press
between 2018 to 2021. This time frame marked the latter years of the Trump administration and the beginning
of the Covid-19 pandemic. We interpret what happened to Americans’ confidence in these social institutions
with a theory offered by Yuval Levin in his 2020 book, A Time to Build. Based on our observations, we also offer
qualifications to Levin’s theme that trust in institutions is primarily a function of the way institutional ‘insiders’
behave.
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Literature Review
Social scientists and social commentators have
observed a general decline in Americans’ trust in
institutions for some time. As early as 2005, Paxton
reported that “Americans’ trust in various institutions
has . . . [continued to drop] since the 1970s” (Paxton
2005: 44). This trend continues to be remarkable,
but not completely uniform, across major American
institutions. The General Social Survey (GSS) collected
data on Americans’ confidence in twelve social
institutions since 1973, and we present data about this
confidence in Figures 1 through 12 in Appendix A,
showing how that the percentage of Americans who
had “some or “a great deal” of confidence changed
between 1973 and 2021 and the overall pattern and
direction of the changes. Figures 1 through 5 present
data on confidence levels in the U.S. Congress, the press,
the executive branch of government, education and
organized religion, all of which suffered clear losses in
public confidence over the period. It is beyond the scope

of this paper to account for the enormous fluctuations
in confidence in particular institutions over time. It has
been argued, for instance, that one reason for the periods
of the biggest loss in confidence in Congress has been
the increasing polarization, the increased inability to
agree on legislation, of the two major parties (e.g., Levin
2020; Klein 2020). Given this account, it is perhaps not
surprising that Congress enjoyed a brief increase in trust
in 2002, when the parties united in their joint response
to 9/11. (See Figure 1.) The great drop in confidence in
the executive branch in 1974 undoubtedly reflects the
impeachment of President Nixon and the great rise in
1977, the election of the much more trusted President
Ford. (See Figure 3.) It is also probable that the drop in
confidence in organized religion between 2000 and 2002
had something to do with the priest scandal that was
uncovered in that period (e.g., Clark & Grandchamp
2011). (See Figure 5.) Finally, the precipitous drops in
confidence experienced by financial institutions (Figure
7) and major companies (Figure 8) between 2008 and
2010 undoubtedly had to do with their perceived role
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in the “Great Recession” and the rebound in confidence
in these institutions during the 2010s, to the rebound
of the economy. Trying to account for all the ups
and downs in confidence experienced by the twelve
institutions shown from in the twelve figures would
be a fruitful subject for future authors. But we cannot
do so here. We will just point out that each of the first
five figures suggest very substantial decreases in the
percentage of respondents reporting “some” or “a great
deal” of confidence in the relevant institutions: from
about 85% to 46% for Congress in 1973 and in 2021,
respectively; from about 85% to 52% for the press; from
about 81% to 56% for the executive branch; from about
92% to 78% for education; and from about 85% to 66%
for organized religion. Figures 6, 7 and 8 suggest that
drops in confidence in medicine, financial institutions
and major companies also occurred over the period,
although these drops were not as dramatic as they were
for Congress, the press, the executive branch, education
and organized religion: only a little over three percent
for medicine, if one compares the beginning and end
points; about 12% for financial institutions; and about
11% for major companies.
Three institutions (science, organized labor and the
U.S. Supreme Court) are perhaps better described as
not having experienced much overall change in the
percentage of respondents saying they had “some” or
“a great deal” of confidence. The percentage expressing
confidence in science was at about 93% in both 1973
and 2021; the percentage for organized labor rose only
2%, from 73% to 75% in 1973 and 2021, respectively;
and the percentage doing so in the Supreme Court was
just over 84% in 1973 and 2018, though this percentage
did drop to 80% during the 2018 to 2021 period, when
President Trump, and the Senate, added conservative
justices.
One institution, the military, experienced a net
increase in public trust covered by the GSS from 81%
to almost 94% between 1973 and 2018, though this
institution experienced a significant loss of confidence
(to about 89%) between 2018 and 2021. We will look at
this loss in more detail below. But our goal in this paper
is to examine recommendations made for improving
trust in institutions in one recent contribution to the
literature—Yuval Levin’s 2020 book, A Time to Build.
We do this with special focus on change in trust in five
institutions (the military, science, medicine, education
and the press) during the most recent GSS inter-survey
period (2018 to 2021). First, we look at Levin’s new
approach.

2
A Promising New Approach to the Decline in Trust
One approach towards improving trust in institutions
suggests that we take them apart and start again.
Presumably reflecting a common populist sentiment,
Donald Trump ran for President partly on a promise of
“draining the swamp” in Washington. This, and other
approaches, captured in calls for “cleaning house,” imply
that the best way to have institutions we can trust is to
dismantle the ones we have and start anew.
This is not the approach offered by Yuval Levin, a
conservative theorist, in his recent book, A Time to Build.
Levin posits that it is not time to destroy but to rebuild
the institutions (from family to religious organizations
to the press to congress) that already exist. At their best,
Levin argues, institutions serve many useful purposes,
including the pursuit of core societal goals. At their
best, they also provide individuals who work within
them a sense of personal meaning, connection and
growth. In Levin’s terms, institutions can be formative
for individuals who work within them, giving them
purpose and the skills to pursue that purpose.
Levin asserts that the basic reason why people have
lost trust in institutions is that some people inside
them do not view their roles within the institutions
as formative for themselves and others, but rather as
platforms for performance—as “when the presidency
and Congress are just stages for political performance
art . . . [or] when journalism is indistinguishable from
activism” (2022: 34). One need only think of recently
newly elected members of the U.S. Congress who have
come to Washington not so much to learn how to
pass legislation (Congress’s purpose) but to tell other
congresspeople, as well as the rest of the country, what
Congress should be doing.
Levin claims that the solution to the problem of
declining trust in institutions is not one of outsiders
criticizing these institutions to the point of their
dissolution, but for insiders to do their jobs with
“devotion.” “[T]he simplest way [to build trust] is for
the people who inhabit our institutions—that is, all of
us—to be more trustworthy” (2020: 200). This simple
solution—for those within institutions to do their jobs
more conscientiously—is the focus of this paper and
one we examine critically here.
We accept Levin’s point that behavior on the part of
actors within an institution (what Levin calls “insiders”)
can undermine or enhance people’s confidence or trust
in that institution. For example, it is likely that some of
the diminution of trust in religious organizations that
occurred between 2000 and 2002 reflected publicized
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scandals about clergy abuse in the Catholic Church until the most recent inter-survey period, the one we
during that period. And that the huge one-year boost in focus on here, from 2018 to 2021. (See Figure 12 in
American’s confidence in the military in 1991 had to do Appendix A.)
with performance—both of leaders and enlisted men—
Why American’s trust in the military fell during this
in the first Gulf War. And yet we do not believe that period can be accounted for using theoretical tools
trust in an institution is simply a matter of what insiders given us by Levin (2020). Beginning in 2019, the US
do. Levin himself occasionally seems to recognize this, began withdrawing troops from Iraq and, beginning in
too. In arguing that journalists need to report more 2020, from Afghanistan. In both cases, this may have
responsibly to enhance the reputation of the press and raised doubts in the minds of many Americans that
media, Levin also points out that “journalists should the military had done its job in those countries, since
recognize that their profession may have a particularly neither conflict had been clearly “won.” Moreover, by
important role to play in any recovery of confidence in withdrawing from Afghanistan, it may have become
[other] American institutions” (2000: 86). If we had particularly clear that early reports that the mission was
more trust in the press, it could keep us from imagining going smoothly, and that Afghan troops, specifically,
the worst about major institutions even while it were prepared to withstand Taliban assaults, had been
uncovered abuses in them.
untrustworthy (e.g., Dowzicky 2022).
The possible effect that representatives of one
Our modification of Levin’s theory, however, leads to
institution can have on trust in another institution is one a more nuanced hypothesis about what was going on
that we examine at greater length here by using General with Americans’ trust in the military during the 2018Social Survey (GSS) data from the 2018 to 2021 inter- 2019 period. Levels of trust in the military have differed
survey period. We examine the interaction between by political party: Republicans tend to have been more
a member of the executive branch of government, trusting than Democrats. But in 2020, President Trump
former President Donald Trump, and the increasing frequently spoke of the need to use the military to deal
or decreasing trust in five American institutions: the with civil disturbances and social justice protests (Shane
military, the press, science, medicine and education. III 2021). Famously, police and national guard troops
We focus on these five institutions because they are were used to clear out demonstrators to permit former
ones on which then former President Trump took a President Trump to do a photo-op outside a church
clear stance during the years of his administration— near the White House (Cammarata 2021). We believe
institutions about which he might, therefore, reasonably Trump’s beliefs about the usefulness of the military for
be expected to have influenced public opinion. We suppressing domestic protest would have been more
conclude our literature review by presenting five troubling to Democrats than to Republicans because the
hypotheses regarding the interaction between Trump’s protests and demonstrations were usually in support of
expressed views and public confidence.
liberal causes. Trump’s asserted beliefs, and their likely
differing effects on his supporters and detractors, lead
The Military
us to a slightly different view from that which Levin’s
theory alone might have led us to: that Democrats’ loss
Figure 12 shows that, between 1973 and 2021, trust of trust in the military during the 2018-2021 period
in the military generally rose. In general, Americans’ will have been substantially greater than the loss
trust seems to have been a direct function of military experienced by Republicans.
engagement somewhere in the world, with the possible
exception of its participation in Vietnam.1 The first The Scientific Community
Gulf War in 1991 led to a huge but one-time increase
in confidence. Military engagement in Afghanistan
The Covid-19 pandemic put science and scientists in
(beginning in 2001) and Iraq (2003) was generally a prominent position during the 2018-2021 period—
associated with a long-term improvement in trust— perhaps in a more prominent position than they had
1
After the United States withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, enjoyed for decades (Funk and Tyson 2022). Scientists
there was actually a reasonably substantial increase in the like Dr. Anthony Fauci captured news headlines and
public’s confidence through much of the rest of the 1970s, television audiences daily. Many Americans, indeed,
until it dropped to new lows in the 1980. Because it began many world citizens, listened for advice about how best
in 1973, the General Social Survey does not permit us to to protect themselves from the virus . . . and rooted for
comment on public trust in the military in the early years of
scientists to come up with a preventions and cures. In a
the Vietnam war.
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sense, Figure 9 gives a slightly misleading sense of what
happened to Americans’ trust in science between 2018
and 2021: it shows that the percentage who had “some”
or “a great deal” of trust in science remained the same,
at about 93.4 percent. But when we disaggregate this
number, we find that the percentage who had a “great
deal” of trust rose substantially from 45.2 percent to
50.4 percent. (See Figure 9 in Appendix A.)
However, the degree to which Americans used the
advice and trusted the preventions and cures those
scientists came up with was again filtered through a
political lens—a lens that was to some degree created
by Donald Trump. In August of 2020, Libby Cathey
(2020) could assert that “President Trump has found
a new foil -- in science” and cited a report from the
Union of Concerned Scientists which asserted there
were already 11 times when the Trump administration
directly undermined Centers for Disease Controls’
recommendations for dealing with the virus. The report
also claimed the administration had directly contradicted
scientists’ recommendations about dealing with climate
change at least 150 times. After all, Trump did pull the
US out of the Paris climate agreement in 2017. Trump’s
disproportionate influence on Republicans, then, leads
us to our second hypothesis that trust in science will
have risen more for Democrats during the 2018-2021
period than it will have done for Republicans.
Education
As Figure 4 shows, trust in education has fluctuated
dramatically, but generally decreased since the early
1970s. A dramatic decrease occurred during the 1980s.
The Reagan administration surely played a part in this,
inasmuch as one of former President Reagan’s stated
goals was to abolish the Education Department and his
Secretary of Education sponsored a commission that
produced a report, “A Nation at Risk,” that received
much notoriety and was highly critical of American
education (Ravitch 1990). The next big drastic decrease
was not until the 2018-2021 period, which is the one
we focus on here. During this period, specifically at the
beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused
students to learn remotely for a long time. This course
of action led many to question whether students were
receiving a solid education. (See Figure 4 in Appendix
A.)
President Trump frequently spoke, in 2020, of
educational systems failing to provide students with
in-person learning. He also spoke of his concerns
about schools teaching the “1619 Project” and “Critical
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Race Theory” (Liptak 2020). Also significant was
the President’s advocacy of a voucher system which
would have enabled parents to put children in private
schools and its implicit (and explicit) criticism of public
education (Black 2020). Trump’s criticism of public
education (its modes of teaching, its content, and its
comparative undesirability more generally) leads us
to our third hypothesis that the loss of trust in the
educational institution by Democrats during the
2018-2021 period will have been smaller than the loss
experienced by Republicans.
Medicine
The COVID-19 pandemic put people in the
pharmaceutical industry to work during the 2018-2021
era. In less than a year after COVID’s outbreak, in 2020,
pharmaceutical companies, including Pfizer, Moderna,
and Johnson and Johnson, came out with suitable
vaccines that were tested, tried and proved to provide
remarkable protection. As can be seen in Figure 6,
between 2018 and 2021, American’s trust in medicine
increased considerably. (See Figure 6 in Appendix A.)
Nonetheless, Mr. Trump expressed hesitancy about
the vaccines and his hesitancy influenced others (Stoler
et all. 2022). Trump’s disproportionate influence on
Republicans leads us to our fourth hypothesis that
trust in medicine will have risen more for Democrats
during the 2018-2021 period than it will have done
for Republicans.
The Press
As shown in Figure 2, Americans’ trust in the press
has generally been in decline since the 1970s. In 1973,
over 85% of Americans reported having “only some” or
“a great deal” of confidence in the press. In the nearly
half century since then, trust in the press has dropped
more than 32 percentage points. In the time since
researchers began measuring trust in institutions, the
press has gone from being one of the most trusted to
one of the least trusted institutions in America. (See
Figure 2 in Appendix A.)
In attempting to understand this decline, much
of the existing literature has found that the most
significant predictor of trust in the press is political
party identification (Pearl 2018; Ladd & Podkul 2019;
Knight Foundation 2020). Historically, Democrats have
reported significantly higher levels of trust in the press
than Republicans do (Bump 2018; Brenan 2021). This
partisan gap appears to have formed and grown as a
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direct result of conservative attacks on the news media confidence level in, say, “education” or “the press.” In
(Ladd & Podkul 2019).
general, many GSS items entail reliability issues (Hout
While he was certainly not the first to do so, Donald and Hastings 2016). (See Figures 1-12 in Appendix A).
Trump attacked the news media more regularly and with
Our central concern, however, is with whether
more hostility than any politician before him (Ladd & changes in the levels of confidence in five of these
Podkul 2019). As candidate and then president, Donald institutions—the military, the scientific community,
Trump called for the harassment, prosecution, and medicine, education and the press—between 2018 and
even jailing of journalists. His constant attacks on the 2021 differ for Republicans and Democrats. In this case,
credibility of news media led to the term “fake news” we recoded a variable that measured party identification
being named the “official Collins Dictionary Word of in terms of eight categories—strong Democrat, not very
the Year for 2017” (Meza 2017). As a result of Trump’s strong Democrat, Independent (close to Democrat),
scathing attacks on the press, our fifth hypothesis is Independent, Independent (close to Republican), not
that trust in the press will have fallen more among very strong Republican, Republican, other party—by
Republicans than among Democrats during the combining the first three categories into a “Democrats”
2018-2021 period.
category and the fourth through seventh categories
into a “Republican” category. Tables 1 through 5
Method
compare the changes in percentage of Republicans and
Democrats who have confidence in each of our five
We use GSS data to measure several variables over institutions of concern between 2018 and 2021. (See
time. We looked at Americans’ confidence in twelve Tables 1-5 in Appendix B.)
social institutions: the military, the scientific community,
medicine, education, the press, the executive branch of Findings
the federal government, congress, the U. S. Supreme
Court, banks and other financial institutions, organized
We now examine what happened to confidence
labor, major businesses, and organized religion. The in five institutions in the 2018 to 2021 period with
GSS measures confidence in each of these institutions special focus on what happened to confidence by party
by respondents’ answers to the question:
affiliation. Figure 12 shows that this period involved the
second greatest drop in confidence in the military (of
“I am going to name some institutions in this country. As 3.9 percent, from 93.3 percent of Americans saying they
far as the people running these institutions are concerned, had some or a great deal of confidence in 2018 to 89.4
would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some percent saying so in 2021) since September 11, 2001.
confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?”
And yet Table 1, in Appendix B, shows that this drop is
partisan. Although there was indeed a drop of 4 percent
And then the interviewer names a particular among Democrats (from 91 percent who had “some”
institution. As identified in the paragraph above, the or “a great deal” of confidence in 2018 to 87 percent in
institutions we focus on here are the “Military,” “The 2021), confidence actually rose by 3.1 percent among
Scientific Community,” “Medicine,” “Education,” Republicans (from 89.3 to 92.4 percent). This change
“The Press,” “The Executive Branch of the Federal presents support for our hypothesis that Democrats
Government,” “Congress,” “The United States Supreme were in fact much more likely to lose confidence in
Court,” “Banks and Other Financial Institutions,” the military during the 2018 to 2021 period than were
“Major Businesses,” “Organized Labor,” and “Organized Republicans.
Religion.”
Table 2 suggests a slight drop in the percentage
We looked at several ways of showing trends in the of Americans who had “some” or “a great deal” of
trust accorded to each of these institutions. In Figures confidence in science between 2018 and 2021—from
1-12, we present a series of graphs that show trends, 93.6 to 92.8 percent. Here whether one chooses to
from 1973 to 2021, in the percentage of respondents measure confidence by combining those who had some
reporting they had “some” or “a great deal” of confidence and a great deal of confidence or just by using “a great
in each social institution. An obvious problem with deal” of confidence alone makes a difference. Because,
using GSS data to measure trends in trust or confidence when one looks just at those with “a great deal” of
in institutions is that one cannot be sure of what confidence, it appears there was a slight increase in the
respondents are focused when they are asked their percentage who had confidence—from 45.3 percent who
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had “a great deal” of confidence to 47.6. What matters
from our point of view, however, is that, once again, is
that regardless of how one measures confidence, there
was a substantial partisan divide. Thus, for example,
the percentage of Republicans who expressed “some”
or “a great deal” of confidence in science dropped
considerably—from 92.9 percent to 86.8 percent.
However, the percentage of Democrats who expressed
such confidence rose from 94.6 percent to 97.3 percent.
(See Table 2 in Appendix B.)
Americans’ overall trust in medicine grew between
2018 and 2021. The percentage of Americans who
had “some” or “a great deal” of trust in medicine was
87.6% in 2018; in 2021, it was 91%. Once again, party
affiliation made a difference. While the percentage of
Democrats who had trust grew from 87.8% in 2018 to
94.7% in 2021, the percentage of Republicans who had
such trust dropped from 91.7% to 88.9%. (See Table 3 in
Appendix B.)
The percentage of Americans who had “some” or “a
great deal” of trust in education fell from 83.2% in 2018 to
79.2% in 2021. The partisan divide here was enormous,
with the percentage of Democrats saying they were
confident actually increasing by 4.6 % (from 83.6% to
88.2%) and the percentage of Republicans saying they
were confident dropping by a whopping 12.7% (from
80.4% to 67.7%). (See Table 4 in Appendix B.)
The percentage of Americans reporting “at least
some” trust in the press dropped from 54% in 2018 to
52.7% in 2021. There was already a huge partisan divide
with regard to trust in the press in 2018: only 30.3% of
Republicans had “at least some” confidence in it then,
while 74.6% of Democrats did. The difference grew
over the 2018-2021 period, with Republicans’ trust level
dropping by 8% (to 22.3%) by 2021 and Democrats’
trust levels increasing by 5% (to 79.6%). (See Table 5 in
Appendix B.)
CONCLUSION
We analyzed the GSS data over time and found
general support for the broadly accepted view that
Americans’ confidence in institutions declined over the
past half century. Indeed, eight of the twelve institutions
we examined did experience such a decline. In order,
from the greatest to the least decline, these institutions
were Congress, the press, the executive branch of
government, education, religious organizations,
financial institutions, major companies and medicine.
We found that three institutions—science, the Supreme
Court and organized labor—basically retained their
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levels of public confidence over the period. And one
institution—the military—actually enjoyed an increase
in public trust.
Our principal finding, though, was of a substantial
partisan divide when it came to changes in confidence
between 2018 and 2021 in the military, science, medicine,
education and the press—all institutions about which
President Trump made substantial comment during
his administration. When Republicans’ confidence
decreased, Democrats’ confidence increased, and
when Republicans’ confidence increased, Democrats’
confidence decreased. We attribute at least part of
these differences to Trump’s expressed views about
the institutions: when he bashed or merely criticized
institutions—as he did science, medicine, public
education and the press—Republican’s lost confidence
in them, while Democrats experienced an increase
in confidence; when he used (or threatened to use)
an institution to do his bidding—as he did with the
military—Republicans experienced an increase in
confidence and Democrats experienced a decrease.
Hence, our proposed modification of Levin’s thesis:
that the public’s confidence in an institution does not
simply reflect efforts on the part of insiders within those
institutions. It can also reflect the observations made
about an institution by charismatic leaders of other
institutions: in this case, a President of the United States.
It is of course possible that something other than former
President Trump’s behavior contributed to the partisan
divides described here. However, the divides themselves
suggest that it is not good enough for insiders to behave
in certain ways to improve (or diminish) trust in their
institution; the people whom they might impress (or
disappoint) will filter that behavior based on their own
beliefs and dispositions and, while these beliefs and
dispositions may be influenced by insider behavior, that
behavior is hardly determinative.
There are limitations to our research. As we have
already mentioned, research using data from the
General Social Survey is somewhat limited by the fact
that the question-wording is sometimes vague. How
respondents interpret the question about confidence
in institutions, for instance, will almost surely vary and
likely affect the overall findings in unknowable ways.
Another limitation is related to the timing of the surveys,
especially the 2021 interviews. Due to the Covid-19
pandemic, the GSS was forced to change its methods
and was unable to collect and release 2020 data. Instead
of in-person interviews, the GSS was administered via
the web for the first time in history, potentially skewing
the results. The 2021 GSS ran from December 1, 2020, to
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May 3, 2021. Donald Trump lost his bid for reelection in Cathey, Libby. 2020 (August 6). “With String of
November 2020. Although the GSS is usually conducted
Attacks on Doctors and Experts, Trump Takes Aim
during election years, it is not usually done so after the
at Science.” ABC News (https://abcnews.go.com/
election. Due to the especially partisan nature of the
Politics/string-attacks-doctors-experts-trump-takes2020 election, it is likely that the timing of the survey
aim-science/story?id=72170408).
had an (again unknowable) impact on the results. And,
as is true of all available data, the GSS cannot be used DiNuzzo, Emily. 2017 (August 1). “This is What Going
to address issues one might be interested in but for
to School Was Like During the Decade You Were
which no data has been collected. Especially after the
Born.” Insider (https://www.insider.com/what-goingPresidential election of 2020 and Trump’s claims that
to-school-was-like-throughout-history-2017-7).
the election was stolen, for instance, it would have been
fascinating to inspect partisan differences in change in Dowzicky, Natalie. 2022 (February 17). “Public
confidence in the electoral system.
Confidence in the Military is Slipping.” Reason
Nonetheless, our research casts strong doubt on the
(https://reason.com/2022/02/17/public-confidenceproposition that what insiders do completely determines
in-the-military-is-slipping/).
how their institution will be perceived. Outsiders’
perspectives are, of course, what really matters when it Funk, Cary and Alec Tyson. 2022 (January 5). “Trust
comes to trust, and these perspectives are not simply a
in America: In the Age of Covid-19, Do Americans
function of insider behavior.
Trust Science?” Pew Research Center (https://www.
pewresearch.org/2022/01/05/trust-in-america-inthe-age-of-covid-19-do-americans-trust-science/).
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Appendix A: Figures 1-12
Figure 1. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence in Congress Over Time
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Figure 2. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence in
the Press Over Time
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Figure 3. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence in the
Executive Branch of Government Over Time
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Figure 4. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence in
Education Over Time
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Figure 5. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence in
Organized Religion Over Time

1973 1975 1977 1980 1983 1986 1988 1990 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2021

Figure 6. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence in
Medicine Over Time
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Figure 7. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence
in Banks and Other Financial Institutions
Over Time
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Figure 8. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence in
Major Companies Over Time
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Figure 9. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence the
Scientific Community Over Time
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Figure 10. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence in
the U.S. Supreme Court Over Time
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Figure 11. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence in
Organized Labor Over Time
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Figure 12. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence in the Military Over Time
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Appendix B. Tables 1-5
Table 1. Percentage of Americans1 Who Have a “Great Deal” or “Only Some” Confidence in Medicine
Year		
All Americans		
Democrats
Republicans
_____________________________________________________________________
2018			87.6			 87.8			91.7
2021			91.0			 94.7			88.9
_____________________________________________________________________
1
These are Americans who declare a party affiliation only.
Table 2. Percentage of Americans1 Who Have a “Great Deal” or “Only Some” Confidence in the Scientific
Community
Year		
All Americans		
Democrats
Republicans
______________________________________________________________________
2018			93.6			 94.6			 92.9
2021			92.8			 97.3			 86.8
______________________________________________________________________
1
These are Americans who declare a party affiliation only.
Table 3. Percentage of Americans1 Who Have a “Great Deal” or “Only Some” Confidence in the Press
Year		
All Americans		
Democrats
Republicans
________________________________________________________________________
2018			55.6			 74.6			 30.3
2021			52.4			 79.7			 22.3
________________________________________________________________________
1
These are Americans who declare a party affiliation only.
Table 4. Percentage of Americans1 Who Have a “Great Deal” or “Only Some” Confidence in the Military
Year		
All Americans		
Democrats
Republicans
_________________________________________________________________________
2018			93.3			 91.0			89.3
2021			89.4			 87.0			92.4
_________________________________________________________________________
1
These are Americans who declare a party affiliation only.
Table 5. Percentage of Americans1 Who Have a “Great Deal” or “Only Some” Confidence in Education
Year		
All Americans		
Democrats
Republicans
_________________________________________________________________________
2018			83.2			 83.6			80.4
2021			79.2			 88.2			67.7
_________________________________________________________________________
1
These are Americans who declare a party affiliation only.
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